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Abstract—Coalition formation is a central part of social inter-
actions. In the emerging era of social peer-to-peer interactions
(e.g., sharing economy), coalition formation will be often carried
out in a decentralized manner, based on participants’ individual
preferences. A likely outcome will be a stable coalition structure,
where no group of participants could cooperatively opt out to
form another coalition that induces higher preferences to all its
members. Remarkably, there exists a number of fair cost-sharing
mechanisms (e.g., equal-split, proportional-split, egalitarian and
Nash bargaining solutions of bargaining games) that model
practical cost-sharing applications with desirable properties of
stable coalition structure, such as its existence and a small strong
price-of-anarchy (SPoA) for approximating the social optimum.
In this paper, we close several gaps on the results of decentralized
coalition formation: (1) We establish a logarithmic lower bound
on SPoA, and hence, show several previously known fair cost-
sharing mechanisms are the best practical mechanisms with
minimal SPoA. (2) We improve the SPoA of egalitarian and
Nash bargaining cost-sharing mechanisms to match the lower
bound. (3) We derive the SPoA of a mix of different cost-sharing
mechanisms. (4) We present a decentralized algorithm to form
a stable coalition structure. (5) Finally, we apply our results
to a novel application of peer-to-peer energy sharing that allows
households to jointly utilize mutual energy resources. We present
an empirical study of decentralized coalition formation in a real-
world P2P energy sharing project.
Index Terms—Decentralized Coalition Formation; Approxi-
mately Socially Optimal; Strong Price of Anarchy;
I. INTRODUCTION
People are increasingly empowered by peer-to-peer inter-
actions. Sharing economy is a prominent example, where
resources, services and facilities can be shared dynamically
among end-users in a peer-to-peer fashion. Particularly, preva-
lent mobile apps and social networks can provide convenient
platforms for facilitating peer-to-peer sharing activities. On
these platforms, users are able to form ad hoc coalitions for
diverse sharing activities, such as carpooling/bikepooling (e.g.,
UberPool, Lyft Line, sRide), parking/storage sharing (e.g.,
Spacer), wireless hotspot sharing (e.g., YourKarma), unused
mobile data sharing (e.g., mobile data gifting), streaming
service sharing (e.g., Netflix account sharing) and various
group buying activities (e.g., Groupon). As a departure from
centralized planning, users are often motivated by individual
preferences and benefits to align themselves to form coalitions
in sharing activities in a decentralized manner.
A thorough understanding of decentralized coalition forma-
tion will be helpful to shape the better social mechanisms for
the emerging era of social peer-to-peer interactions. Traditional
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cooperative game theory [1] usually considers forming a grand
coalition involving every user mediated by a centralized plan-
ner, whereas practical sharing economy is often populated by
small-group coalition formation in a decentralized manner. A
better model for decentralized coalition formation is a hedonic
game [2], [3], where participants aim to form coalitions among
themselves according to certain preferences over the coalitions
they may belong to. A likely outcome of a hedonic game is a
stable coalition structure of disjoint coalitions of participants,
where no group of participants could cooperatively opt out to
form another coalition that induces higher preferences to all its
members. However, a hedonic game with arbitrary preferences
may not induce a desirable stable coalition structure.
In this paper, we adopt an algorithmic game theoretical
approach. We aim to devise practically useful mechanisms
for decentralized coalition formation in a hedonic game that
lead to desirable stable coalition structures. In particular, we
draw on our recent work [4] in studying decentralized coalition
formation for the purpose of cost-sharing in sharing economy.
We previously showed some remarkable properties of several
fair cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., equal-split, proportional-
split, egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions of bargaining
games) for practical cost-sharing applications, such as the
existence of stable coalition structure and a small strong price-
of-anarchy (SPoA). SPoA is a common metric in algorithmic
game theory [5] by which one compares the worst-case ratio
between a strong Nash equilibrium (that allows any group
of users to deviate jointly to form a coalition) and a social
optimum. A decentralized mechanism with a small SPoA will
guarantee a good approximation of social optimality, without
relying on centralized planning.
In this paper, we close several gaps on the results of
decentralized coalition formation:
1) We establish a logarithmic lower bound on SPoA for
practical polynomial-time mechanisms, and hence, show
several previously known fair cost-sharing mechanisms
as the best practical mechanisms with minimal SPoA.
2) We improve the SPoA of egalitarian and Nash bargain-
ing cost-sharing mechanisms from previously known
square-root SPoA to match the logarithmic lower bound.
3) We consider a mix of different cost-sharing mechanisms.
We derive a logarithmic SPoA with respect to mixed
cost-sharing mechanisms.
4) We present a decentralized algorithm to form a stable
coalition structure under several fair cost-sharing mech-
anisms, based on deferred-acceptance algorithm.
5) We apply our results to a novel application of peer-to-
peer energy sharing that allows households to jointly
utilize mutual energy resources (e.g., rooftop PVs, home
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2batteries) to save energy cost. We present an empirical
study of decentralized coalition formation in a real-world
P2P energy sharing project.
II. RELATED WORK
Coalition formation has been studied in traditional coopera-
tive game theory [1], which provides a foundation of forming
a grand coalition, involving all the members, subject to cer-
tain axiomatic properties. For example, the notions of core,
Shapley value, and nucleolus have been devised to construct
proper transfer functions of utility among participants in a
grand coalition. However, such a setting is usually considered
in the perspective of a centralized planner, who divides the
benefits of a coalition among the members.
On the other hand, traditional non-cooperative game the-
ory considers limited decentralized decisions of players in a
Nash equilibrium characterized by unilateral strategic changes.
The notion of decentralized coalition formation requires both
elements of cooperative and non-cooperative game theories
to capture coalition formation in a non-cooperative manner,
without being restricted to a grand coalition.
Recently, there has been a number of studies about non-
cooperative coalition formation. These coalition formation
models belong to the topic of hedonic games and network
cost-sharing games (e.g., [6], [3], [7], [8], [9], [2], [10], [11],
[12], [13]). A useful notion to model non-cooperative coalition
formation is a strong Nash equilibrium. Unlike a typical Nash
equilibrium that tolerates only unilateral strategic change by
one participant at a time, a strong Nash equilibrium can
tolerate collective strategic changes by any group of partici-
pants. Such collective strategic changes can model an alternate
coalition formation from the existing coalition structure.
Our study of decentralized coalition formation follows hedo-
nic games [3], [10], where participants form coalitions based
on individual preferences over coalition formation. We seek
to characterize the properties of strong Nash equilibrium in
specific settings of hedonic games. Typical hedonic games
allow arbitrary preferences of coalitions, which can lead to
the absence of a strong Nash equilibrium (or so-called a core-
stable coalition structure).
We consider the hedonic games specifically for cost-sharing
applications, such that participants aim to split the associated
cost of a coalition. In this cost-sharing setting, the individual
preferences over coalition formation are governed by a cost-
sharing mechanism. Our previous work [4] showed that certain
cost-sharing mechanisms can yield the existence of a strong
Nash equilibrium.
We also characterize the strong price-of-anarchy (SPoA) of
hedonic games with certain cost-sharing mechanisms. SPoA is
a common metric in algorithmic game theory [5] that compares
the worst-case ratio between a strong Nash equilibrium (that
allows any group of users to deviate jointly to form stable
coalitions) and a social optimum. Other studies related to our
results are the price-of-anarchy for stable matching in a 2-
coalition setting [14], [15].
III. MODEL AND NOTATIONS
A. Coalition Formation Model
This section presents a general model of decentralized
coalition formation. This model is based on hedonic games
[3], [2]. In this model, there are a set of n participants N . A
coalition of participants is represented by a subset G ⊆ N .
A coalition structure represents a feasible state of coalition
formation, which is denoted by a partition of N as P ⊂ 2N ,
such that
⋃
G∈P G = N and G1 ∩ G2 = ∅ for any pair
G1, G2 ∈ P . For example, P = {{i1, i2}, {i3}}.
Each element G ∈ P is called a coalition (or a group).
The set of singleton coalitions, Pself , {{i} : i ∈ N},
is called the standalone coalition structure, wherein no one
forms a coalition with others. We consider K-coalition struc-
tures with at most K participants per coalition. In practice,
K is often much less than n, which models small-group
coalition formation. Let the set of partitions of N be P . Let
PK , {P ∈ P : |G| ≤ K for each G ∈ P} be the set of
feasible coalition structures, such that each coalition consists
of at most K participants.
B. Stable Coalition Structures
Because participants are self-interested, they are motivated
to join a coalition to maximize utility. Let ui(G) be the utility
function of user i when joining a coalition G, which maps G
to a numerical benefit that i will perceive. For clarity, we set
the standalone utility ui({i}) = 0 when i joins no coalitions.
A coalition of participants G is called a blocking coalition
with respect to coalition structure P if all participants in G
can strictly increase their utilities when they form a coalition
G instead of the coalitions in P . Namely,
ui(G) > ui(G
′) for all i ∈ G,G′ ∈ P where i ∈ G′ (1)
A coalition structure is called a stable coalition structure,
denoted by Pˆ ∈ PK , if there exists no blocking coalition
with respect to Pˆ . Note that a stable coalition structure is also
a strong Nash equilibrium1. In a stable coalition structure, the
utility for every participant is always non-negative ui(G) ≥ 0.
Otherwise, the participant will not join any coalition because
of ui({i}) = 0. There may or may not exist a stable coalition
structure in a hedonic game. Determining the existence of a
stable coalition structure is NP-hard [3], [10].
C. Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Specifically, we consider coalition formation for cost-
sharing, and the induced hedonic games by certain cost-sharing
mechanisms. There is a non-negative cost function of each
coalition G, denoted by C(G). Also, denote Ci , C({i}) as
the standalone (or default) cost for participant i.
There is an important property called cost monotonicity,
which will hold in many cost-sharing applications:
C(H) ≤ C(G), if H ⊆ G. (2)
1A strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, in which no group of
players can cooperatively deviate in an allowable way that benefits all of its
members.
3Namely, a larger coalition should incur a larger cost.
By agreeing to form a coalition G, the participants in G are
supposed to share the cost C(G). A cost-sharing mechanism
is characterized by a payment function pi(G), which is the
shared cost of participant i ∈ G. A cost-sharing mechanism
pi(·) is said to be budget balanced, if
∑
i∈G pi(G) = C(G)
for every G ⊆ N .
Given a coalition G, the utility function of participant i ∈ G
can be derived from the payment function as follows:
ui(G) = Ci − pi(G) (3)
Namely, the utility function measures the surplus of joining
coalition G, as compared with being standalone.
In this paper, we consider the following simple well-defined
cost-sharing mechanisms (denoted by different superscripts):
1) Equal-split Cost-Sharing: The cost is split equally
among all participants:
peqi (G) ,
C(G)
|G| (4)
Namely, ueqi (G) = Ci − C(G)|G| .
2) Proportional-split Cost-Sharing: The cost is split pro-
portionally according to the participants’ standalone
costs:
pppi (G) ,
Ci · C(G)∑
j∈G Cj
(5)
Namely, uppi (G) = Ci ·
(
∑
j∈G Cj)−C(G)∑
j∈G Cj
.
3) Bargaining-based Cost-Sharing: The cost-sharing
problem can be formulated as a bargaining game [16],
with a feasible set, and a disagreement point, by which
the the participants will fall back on when no coali-
tion is formed. Under the bargaining game model, the
feasible set is the set of utility values (uˆi)i∈G, such
that
∑
i∈G uˆi ≤
∑
i∈G ui(G) (equivalently,
∑
i∈G pi ≥
C(G)), and the disagreement point is (uˆi = 0)i∈G when
each participant pays only the respective standalone
cost. There are two common bargaining solutions in the
literature [16]:
a) Egalitarian-split Cost-Sharing is given by:
pegai (G) , Ci −
(
∑
j∈G Cj)− C(G)
|G| (6)
Namely, all participants i ∈ G will receive the
same utility as uegai (G) =
(
∑
j∈G Cj)−C(G)
|G| .
b) Nash Bargaining Solution is given by:(
pnsi (G)
)
i∈G ∈ arg max(pˆi)i∈G
∏
i∈G
ui(pˆ) (7)
subject to ∑
i∈G
pˆ = C(G)
It can be shown that both egalitarian-split cost-sharing
and Nash bargaining solution produce equivalent coali-
tion structures2 [4].
Fig. 1: Comparison of uegai ({i, j}) and uppi ({i, j}). If Cj ≥
Ci, u
ega
i ({i, j}) ≥ uppi ({i, j}). Otherwise, uppi ({i, j}) ≥
ueqai ({i, j}).
Remarks: While equal-split cost-sharing mechanism dis-
tributes the cost equally to every user regardless of their
standalone costs, proportional-split and egalitarian-split cost-
sharing mechanisms distribute the cost with varying degrees.
For example, G = {i, j}, we plot uegai ({i, j}) and uppi ({i, j})
according to Ci and Cj in Fig. 1, assuming C({i, j}) = 1.
If Cj ≥ Ci, then uegai ({i, j}) ≥ uppi ({i, j}). Otherwise,
uppi ({i, j}) ≥ ueqai ({i, j}). Namely, egalitarian-split cost-
sharing favors smaller standalone costs, whereas proportional-
split cost-sharing favors larger ones.
Unlike general hedonic games, certain cost-sharing mech-
anisms can guarantee the existence of a stable coalition
structure as given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. ([4]) There exist stable coalition structures
under equal-split, proportional-split and egalitarian-split cost-
sharing mechanisms, and Nash bargaining solution.
Another cost-sharing mechanism called usage-based cost-
sharing mechanism is also considered in [4], which does not
always guarantee the existence of a stable coalition structure.
D. Strong Price-of-Anarchy
Given a coalition structure P , let u(G) ,∑i∈G ui(G) and
u(P) , ∑G∈P u(G). We call u(P) the social utility of P .
A social optimum is a coalition structure that maximizes the
total social utility of all users: P∗ = arg maxP∈PK u(P).
Define the utility-based Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA)
as the worst-case ratio between the social utility of a stable
coalition structure and that of a social optimum over any
instance of u(·) and its stable coalition structure:
SPoAuK , max
u(·),Pˆ
u(P∗)
u(Pˆ) (8)
2Furthermore, in egalitarian-split and Nash bargaining cost-sharing, non-
positive payment (i.e., pegai (G) < 0 or p
ns
i (G) < 0) is possible because
it may need to compensate those with low standalone costs to reach equal
utility among all participants. [4] also showed the equivalence of stable
coalition structures in egalitarian-split and Nash bargaining cost-sharing with
and without non-negative payment constraints.
4Specifically, SPoA when using specific cost-sharing mecha-
nisms are denoted by SPoAu,eqK , SPoA
u,pp
K , SPoA
u,ega
K , respec-
tively. SPoA provides a metric of measuring social optimality.
Define the social cost of P by C(P) , ∑G∈P C(G). For
any budget balanced cost-sharing mechanism, C(P) = u(P).
Hence, a social optimum equivalently minimizes the social
cost of all users: P∗ = arg minP∈PK C(P).
For cost-sharing applications, we define cost-based SPoA
with respect to cost over any instance of C(·) and its stable
coalition structure:
SPoACK , max
C(·),Pˆ
C(Pˆ)
C(P∗) (9)
For arbitrary hedonic games and cost-sharing mechanisms,
the SPoA can be as large as K: SPoACu = O(K) and
SPoACK = O(K). Next, we will see that certain cost-sharing
mechanisms can induce only logarithmic SPoA.
E. Mixed Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Equal-split, proportional-split and egalitarian-split cost-
sharing mechanisms are called pure cost-sharing mechanisms.
In addition, one can also consider a mixed setting with
these pure cost-sharing mechanisms. A mixed cost-sharing
mechanism consists of a set of constituent pure cost-sharing
mechanisms. For a coalition structure P , the cost of C(G),
where G ∈ P , is divided according to one of the constituent
pure cost-sharing mechanisms for every participant i ∈ G. A
stable coalition structure with respect to a mixed cost-sharing
mechanism exists, if there is no blocking coalition induced by
any constituent pure cost-sharing mechanism.
Note that even if its constituent pure cost-sharing mech-
anisms always guarantee the existence of stable coalition
structures, a mixed cost-sharing mechanism may not guarantee
the existence of a stable coalition structure.
F. Outline of Results
We present the theoretical results of this paper. The full
proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Cost-based SPoA has been studied in prior work [4]. We can
relate utility-based SPoA to cost-based SPoA by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Consider a budget balanced cost-sharing mech-
anism pi(·). Denote the cost-based and utility-based strong
prices of anarchy by SPoACK and SPoA
u
K , respectively. Then
SPoAuK ≥
K − 1
K − SPoACK
SPoACK ≤ K −
K − 1
SPoAuK
(10)
There are some previously known cost-based SPoA results:
Proposition 2. ([4]) The SPoA of equal-split cost-sharing
mechanism with cost monotonicity is upper bounded by
SPoAC,eqK = O(logK).
Proposition 3. ([4]) The SPoA of proportional-split cost-
sharing mechanism with cost monotonicity is upper bounded
by SPoAC,ppK = O(logK).
Proposition 4. ([4]) The SPoA of egalitarian-split cost-
sharing mechanism and Nash bargaining solution with cost
monotonicity is upper bounded by SPoAC,egaK = SPoA
C,ns
K =
O(
√
K logK).
In this paper, we are able to improve the bound of SPoA
of egalitarian-split cost-sharing mechanism by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For egalitarian-split cost-sharing mechanism and
Nash bargaining solution with cost monotonicity, the SPoA is
upper bounded by
SPoAC,egaK = SPoA
C,ns
K = O(logK) (11)
Remarks: Hence, we can conclude that equal-split,
proportional-split and egalitarian-split cost-sharing mecha-
nisms and Nash bargaining solution share the same logarithmic
order of magnitude in SPoA. Let Pˆeq, Pˆpp, Pˆega be the
stable coalition structures for equal-split, proportional-split
and egalitarian-split cost-sharing mechanisms, respectively.
Because of the benchmark against the social optimum in
Propositions 2-3 and Theorem 2, we can also bound the worst-
case ratio of stable coalition structures among different cost-
sharing mechanisms as follows:
max
Pˆeq,Pˆpp,C(·)
max
{C(Pˆpp)
C(Pˆeq) ,
C(Pˆeq)
C(Pˆpp)
}
= O(logK)
max
Pˆpp,Pˆega,C(·)
max
{ C(Pˆpp)
C(Pˆega) ,
C(Pˆega)
C(Pˆpp)
}
= O(logK)
max
Pˆega,Pˆeq,C(·)
max
{C(Pˆega)
C(Pˆeq) ,
C(Pˆeq)
C(Pˆega)
}
= O(logK)
Namely, the costs of these cost-sharing mechanisms are not
far from each other.
We next provide a logarithmic lower bound on SPoA for
practical polynomial-time mechanisms in Theorem 3. Hence,
it shows that equal-split, proportional-split and egalitarian-split
cost-sharing mechanisms and Nash bargaining solution are the
best practical mechanisms with minimal SPoA.
Theorem 3. For any cost-sharing mechanism, such that a
stable coalition structure can be found in polynomial-time, its
SPoA is lower bounded by Ω(logK), under the assumption
that P6=NP, .
We can also derive the SPoA for a mixed cost-sharing mech-
anism as the the upper bound of the SPoA of its constituent
pure cost-sharing mechanisms in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. For a mixed cost-sharing mechanism of a con-
stant number of constituent pure cost-sharing mechanisms, if
the SPoA of each constituent pure cost-sharing mechanism is
O(f(K)), then the SPoA of the mixed cost-sharing mechanism
is also O(f(K)).
IV. DECENTRALIZED COALITION FORMATION
ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a decentralized coalition for-
mation algorithm. Our previous paper [4] has presented a
centralized coalition formation algorithm. This decentralized
coalition formation process is based on the classical deferred-
acceptance algorithms (e.g., Gale-Shapley algorithm for stable
5marriage problem and Irving algorithm for stable roommates
problem). We extend the deferred-acceptance algorithms to
coalition formation with more than 2 participants per coalition.
We first define some notations. For each participant i ∈ N ,
let Gi , {G ⊆ N : i ∈ G and G ∈ P ∈ PK}
be the set of feasible coalitions that include participant i.
Note that Gi also includes the standalone coalition {i}. Each
participant i has a preference over Gi, defined by ui(·). Denote
participant i’s preference by an ordered sequence PREFi =
(G1, G2, .., Gt, ..., {i}) such that ui(Gt−1) ≥ ui(Gt). For
brevity, we only consider the coalition G in i’s preference
where ui(G) > 0 = ui({i}). We define two operations that
enumerate the preference PREFi:
1) TOP(PREFi) returns the topmost preferred coalition
from PREFi.
2) REMOVE(PREFi, G) removes G from PREFi.
During the process of decentralized coalition formation,
each participant i carries a tuple of variables:〈
PROPSi,Hi, SUSPENDi
〉
• PROPSi ⊆ Gi is a set of proposed coalitions received
by i. For each G ∈ PROPSi, we define a function
PROPOSER(G) 7→ G that indicates its proposer.
• Hi ∈ Gi is a coalition that is currently held for consider-
ation by i.
• SUSPENDi is a boolean variable, indicating if i is sus-
pended from proposing the next-top preferred coalition
to other participants.
Initially, set Hi ← ∅ and SUSPENDi ← FALSE, PROPSi ←
∅. We define a decentralized process, COLN-FORM, consisting
of multiple rounds with three stages per each round as follows:
1) Proposing Stage: First, if participant i is not suspended
(i.e., SUSPENDi = FALSE), then i will propose the next
topmost preferred coalition G = TOP(PREFi), when G
is better than Hi, the current one held for consideration
(i.e., ui(G) > ui(Hi)). Otherwise, i is paused from
proposing. Once i has proposed G to all j ∈ G\{i}, G
is removed from the preference by REMOVE(PREFi, G).
2) Evaluation Stage: Then, each participant j collects the
set of proposed coalitions PROPSj that were received
from the proposing stage. If any proposed coalition
G ∈ PROPSj is not better than the current one held
for consideration (i.e., ui(Hi) > ui(G)), then G will
be rejected, and PROPOSER(G) and other members in
G will be notified. The rejected coalition G will be
removed from the members’ proposed coalition sets
PROPSk for all k ∈ G.
3) Selection Stage: The remaining proposed coalitions in
PROPSj of each j are not rejected by any members
and are better than the ones currently held for con-
sideration. Next, each participant j picks the topmost
preferred3 coalition H from PROPSj and notifies the
other members in H . If all members k ∈ H (except
3We assume that there is a deterministic tie-breaking for each participants,
such that when a pair of coalitions are ranked equally by two participants,
they will always carry out tie-breaking in a consistent manner, for example,
using the same tie-breaking rule.
PROPOSER(H)) also pick H as their most preferred
coalition from the respective lists of proposed coalitions
PROPSk, then H will be held for consideration by all
members H , and the previous held coalition Hk will
be replaced by H . The members in the previous held
coalition ` ∈ Hk will be notified and their current held
coalition will be replaced by ∅. The previous proposer
PROPOSER(Hk) will resume to propose in the next
round (i.e., SUSPENDi ← FALSE). But the proposer
PROPOSER(H) will be suspended from proposing (i.e.,
SUSPENDi ← TRUE).
4) Termination Stage: If some participants are not in
any coalition held for consideration, then the process
proceeds to the next round and repeats the proposing,
evaluation and selection stages. Otherwise, the coalition
formation process will terminate.
A. Convergence to Stable Coalition Structure
We define a cyclic preference as sequences (i1, ..., it) and
(G1, ..., Gt), where ik ∈ Gk ∩ Gk+1 for all k ≤ t − 1, and
it ∈ Gt ∩G1, such that
ui1(G2) > ui1(G1),
ui2(G3) > ui2(G2),
...
uit(G1) > uit(Gt)
Proposition 5. ([4]) There exists no cyclic preference un-
der equal-split, proportional-split and egalitarian-split cost-
sharing mechanisms, and Nash bargaining solution.
Theorem 5. If there exists no cyclic preference, then COLN-
FORM will converge to a stable coalition structure in O(nK).
By Proposition 5 and Theorem 5, COLN-FORM will
converge to a stable coalition structure under equal-split,
proportional-split and egalitarian-split cost-sharing mecha-
nisms, and Nash bargaining solution.
If COLN-FORM is executed sequentially when one partici-
pant following another, the running time is O(nK). However,
COLN-FORM can also be executed in parallel among the
participants, and the actual running time is less than O(nK).
V. APPLICATION TO P2P ENERGY SHARING
In this paper, we also evaluate decentralized coalition forma-
tion in real-world applications. Previously, we have performed
empirical studies of decentralized coalition formation on ride-
sharing [17] and mobile edge computing [18]. In this paper,
we apply our model of decentralized coalition formation to the
application of P2P energy sharing [19], [20]. Without sharing,
each user will only use his local energy resources (e.g., rooftop
PV and home battery) to satisfy local energy demand, in
addition to acquiring energy from the grid. However, local
energy resources may be underutilized or out of capacity. By
sharing mutual energy resources in P2P energy sharing, the
users can optimize the efficiency of their energy resources. In
practice, energy importing and exporting among users can be
achieved by “virtual net metering”, which is a billing process
6at the utility operator that allows the credits of energy export
of one user to offset the debits of energy import of another.
Fig. 2: Variables of the energy management system.
We consider the scenario of allowing at most K users to
establish P2P energy sharing agreement in a coalition for
an extended period of time. We limit the size K, as to
reduce the control overhead of management of multiple energy
resources. We first define operational variables of a user’s
energy management system, as illustrated in Fig. 2:
• Demand: Each user i ∈ N is characterized by an energy
demand function ai(t). The demand function can be
estimated based on the prediction from historical data.
• Rooftop PV: Each user i ∈ N is equipped with rooftop
PV, characterized by an energy supply function ri(t).
The supply function ri(t) is divided into three feed-in
rates: rai (t) is for demand satisfaction, r
b
i (t) for charging
battery, and rgi (t) for electricity feed-in to the grid.
• Home Battery: Each user i ∈ N is equipped with home
battery, characterized by capacity Bi. The battery is con-
strained by charging efficiency ηc ≤ 1 and discharging
efficiency ηd ≥ 1, charge rate constraint µc and discharge
rate constraint µd. Let bi(t) be the current state-of-charge
in the battery at time t, and dai (t) be the discharge rate
for demand satisfaction, whereas dgi (t) be the discharge
rate for electricity feed-in to the grid.
• Grid: Each user can also import electricity from the grid,
if his demand is not entirely satisfied. Further, rooftop
PV and home battery can inject excessive electricity
into the grid, when feed-in compensation is offered by
utility operator. Let C+g be the per-unit cost by the
grid on electricity consumption, and C−g be the per-
unit compensation on electricity feed-in. Let g+i (t) be
the electricity consumption rate of user i at time t, and
g−i (t) be the electricity feed-in rate. Let g
a
i (t) be the
consumption rate for demand satisfaction, and gbi (t) be
the consumption rate for charging battery.
If a group of users G ⊆ N form a coalition to share their
energy resources and to minimize their total operational cost,
then C(G) can be defined as the minimum cost of in the
energy management optimization problem (EP).
In (EP), there is per-unit service fee Cs, charged by the
utility operator for virtual net metering. Let s+i (t) and s
−
i (t)
(EP) C(G) , min
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈G
(
C+g g
+
i (t)− C−g g−i (t) + Css+i (t)
)
s.t. bi(t+ 1)− bi(t) = ηc(rbi (t) + gbi (t))
− ηd(dai (t) + dgi (t)), (12)
0 ≤ bi(t) ≤ Bi, bi(0) = 0, (13)
gbi (t) + r
b
i (t) ≤ µc, (14)
dai (t) + d
g
i (t) ≤ µd, (15)
dai (t) + g
a
i (t) + r
a
i (t) = ai(t), (16)
rai (t) + r
b
i (t) + r
g
i (t) = ri(t), (17)
gai (t) + g
b
i (t) = g
+
i (t) + s
+
i (t), (18)
dgi (t) + r
g
i (t) = g
−
i (t) + s
−
i (t), (19)∑
i∈G
s+i (t) =
∑
i∈G
s−i (t) (20)
var. bi(t) ≥ 0, dai (t) ≥ 0, dgi (t) ≥ 0,∀t ∈ [1, T ],∀i ∈ G
rai (t) ≥ 0, rbi (t) ≥, rgi (t) ≥ 0,∀t ∈ [1, T ],∀i ∈ G
gai (t) ≥ 0, gbi (t) ≥ 0, s+i (t) ≥ 0, s−i (t) ≥ 0
be the consumption rate and the feed-in rate under virtual
net metering for user i, respectively. We assume Cs < C−g .
Otherwise, there is no need for energy sharing.
Remarks: Service fee Cs is an important factor to viability
of coalition-based optimization. High service fee Cs will
deter coalition formation in P2P energy sharing. As long as
Cs < C
+
g − C−g , it is still viable to transfer PV energy via
virtual net metering, because price difference C+g − C−g that
represents simultaneous importing and exporting electricity, is
still higher than virtual net metering at the cost Cs. Since C−g
is sometimes very low in practice, even Cs ≥ C−g is viable
to coalition formation, as it pays more to grid operator for
virtual net metering than exporting to the grid. We assume that
all users are energy consumers, rather than energy producers.
Hence, the standalone cost Ci is always positive for all users.
A. Evaluation Study
We present an empirical study of decentralized coalition
formation in a real-world P2P energy sharing project. A
field trial has been conducted on Bruny Island, Tasmania
in Australia, where approximately 31 batteries were installed
with solar PV systems in the homes of selected residents of the
island. The batteries include customized management software
that allows programmable control of the battery management
operations. The participating households provide energy data
for empirical studies. Next, we evaluate the outcomes of
coalition formation under different cost-sharing mechanisms
with 31 households. The evaluation is based on the default
parameters in Table I.
The coalition structures for K = 2 and 3 are visualized
in Figs. 3-4. The mechanisms successfully form 8-15 non-
singleton coalitions (when K = 2) and 8-10 non-singleton
coalitions (when K = 3). When K = 2, the social optimum
has social cost as $1594.4 and social utility as $325.2, whereas
7Fig. 3: Coalition structures (when K = 2) under different cost-sharing mechanisms and social optimum.
Fig. 4: Coalition structures (when K = 3) under different cost-sharing mechanisms and social optimum.
Battery capacity (Bi,) 9.8 kWh
Consumption tariff (C+g ) $0.20/kWh
Feed-in tariff (C−g ) $0.10/kWh
Settlement service fee (Cs) $0.00/kWh
Charging efficiency (ηc) 0.95
Discharging efficiency (ηd) 1.05
Charge rate (µc) 5
Discharge rate (µd) 5
TABLE I: Default parameters used in evaluation.
the egalitarian-split cost-sharing has social cost as $1672.1 and
social utility as $247.5. When K = 3, the social optimum has
social cost as $1206.4 and social utility as $713.2, whereas
the egalitarian-split cost-sharing has social cost as $1306.1
and social utility as $613.5. In both cases, the egalitarian-split
cost-sharing is very close to the social optimum. Also, equal-
split cost-sharing gives the most social cost and least social
utility among the three cost-sharing mechanisms.
Next, we vary the parameters to compare the outcomes of
different cost-sharing mechanisms.
1) Consumption Tariff: The consumption tariff is the cost
per kWh of energy imported from the grid. The results in Fig. 5
suggest an increase in consumption tariff causes a decrease in
the utility. This is expected because an increase in the cost
of electricity will cause any potential savings to diminish.
Nonetheless, the relative differences among these cost-sharing
mechanisms are preserved under different consumption tariffs.
2) Battery Capacity: Different battery capacities were con-
sidered to assess their impact on decentralized coalition for-
mation. The results in in Fig. 6 suggest that larger batteries can
result in greater utility. The largest and smallest batteries have
the capacities of 13.2 kWh and 4.5 kWh, respectively. Despite
the larger battery having almost three times the capacity of the
smaller battery, it has less than twice the utility. This suggests
that battery capacity has a lesser impact than consumption
tariff. Also, the relative differences among the cost-sharing
mechanisms are preserved under different battery capacities.
Remarks: Although the theoretical SPoA are in the same
logarithmic order of magnitude for equal-split, proportional-
split and egalitarian-split cost-sharing mechanisms. There are
observable differences in empirical evaluation. In P2P energy
sharing, egalitarian-split cost-sharing is observed to have a
closest approximation to the social optimum, whereas equal-
split cost-sharing is the furthest from the social optimum,
among the three cost-sharing mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied decentralized coalition formation
by hedonic games, under certain cost-sharing mechanisms.
(e.g., equal-split, proportional-split, egalitarian and Nash bar-
gaining solutions of bargaining games). We closed several gaps
on the results of decentralized coalition formation: (1) We
established a logarithmic lower bound on SPoA, and hence,
show several previously known fair cost-sharing mechanisms
are the best practical mechanisms with minimal SPoA. (2) We
improved the SPoA of egalitarian and Nash bargaining cost-
sharing mechanisms to match the lower bound. (3) We derived
the SPoA of a mix of different cost-sharing mechanisms.
8Fig. 5: Evaluation results under different settings of consumption tariffs.
Fig. 6: Evaluation results under different settings of battery capacities.
(4) We presented a decentralized algorithm to form a stable
coalition structure. (5) We applied our results to the application
of peer-to-peer energy sharing with an empirical study.
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APPENDIX
A. Preliminaries
Lemma 1. ([4]) Recall that Pself ,
{{i} : i ∈ N}. A social
optimum is denoted by P∗ = arg maxP∈PK u(P). Then we
obtain K · C(P∗) ≥ C(Pself). A stable coalition structure
is denoted by Pˆ ∈ PK . Consider a budget balanced cost-
sharing mechanism pi(·). Then we obtain C(Pself) ≥ C(Pˆ).
Hence, the cost-based strong price of anarchy SPoACK ≤ K.
Theorem 1. Consider a budget balanced cost-sharing mech-
anism pi(·). Denote the cost-based and utility-based strong
prices of anarchy by SPoACK and SPoA
u
K , respectively. Then
SPoAuK ≥
K − 1
K − SPoACK
(21)
SPoACK ≤ K −
K − 1
SPoAuK
(22)
Proof. Since pi(·) is budget balanced, we obtain C(P ′∗) =
C(P∗), where P ′∗ is a utility-based social optimum and P∗
is a cost-based social optimum. Consider a worst-case stable
coalition structure Pˆ . Then
SPoAuK ≥
∑
G∈P∗
∑
i∈G ui(pi(G))∑
G∈Pˆ
∑
i∈G ui(pi(G))
(23)
=
C(Pself)− C(P∗)
C(Pself)− C(Pˆ)
=
C(Pself )
C(P∗) − 1
C(Pself )
C(P∗) − C(Pˆ)C(P∗)
(24)
=
C(Pself )
C(P∗) − 1
C(Pself )
C(P∗) − SPoACK
(25)
9Since C(Pself )C(P∗) ≤ K (by Lemma 1) and SPoACK ≥ 1, the
minimal is attained when C(Pself )C(P∗) = K.
Given an order of users N = {i1, ..., in} and cost-sharing
mechanism pi(·), we define
α
(
pi(·)
)
, max
C(·),G∈PK
∀s=1,...,k: pis
(
Hs(G)
)
≥0
∑
s∈{1,...,n}:is∈G
pis
(
Hs(G)
)
C(G)
,
(26)
where
Hs(G) ,
{
G\{i1, ..., is−1}, if is ∈ G,
∅, if is /∈ G (27)
In the following, we made a slight but critical modification
of a Lemma in [4], which allows us to improve the bound
SPoACK for egalitarian-split cost-sharing.
Lemma 2. Consider budget balanced cost-sharing mechanism
pi(·), which assumes a non-negative value on any coalition
belonging to a stable coalition structure. Given a stable
coalition structure Pˆ and any coalition structure P ⊆ PK ,
we have the upper bound:
C(Pˆ)
C(P) ≤ α
(
pi(·)
)
(28)
Proof. Let P = {G1, ..., Gh}. Define H11 , G1. Then there
exists a user i11 ∈ H11 and a coalition Gˆ11 ∈ PˆK , such that
i11 ∈ Gˆ11 and pi11(H11 ) ≥ pi11(Gˆ11) ≥ 0; otherwise, all the
users in H11 would form a coalition H
1
1 to strictly reduce
their payments, which contradicts the fact that PˆK is a stable
coalition structure.
Next, define H12 , H11\{i11}. Note that H12 is a feasible
coalition, because arbitrary coalition structures with at most
K users per coalition are allowed in our model. By the same
argument, there exists i12 ∈ H12 and a coalition Gˆ12 ∈ PˆK , such
that i12 ∈ Gˆ12 and pi12(H12 ) ≥ pi12(Gˆ12) ≥ 0.
Let Gt = {it1, ..., itKt}, for any t ∈ {1, ..., h}. Continuing
this argument, we obtain a collection of sets {Hts}, where each
Hts , {its, ..., itKt} satisfies the following condition:
for any t ∈ {1, ..., h} and s ∈ {1, ...,Kt}, there
exists Gˆts ∈ PˆK , such that its ∈ Gˆts and pits(Hts) ≥
pits(Gˆ
t
s) ≥ 0.
Because of budget balance, we have
h∑
t=1
Kt∑
s=1
pits(Gˆ
t
s) = C(PˆK) (29)
Hence, the SPoA, SPoACK , with respect to {pi(·)}i∈N is
upper bounded by
C(PˆK)
C(P) =
∑h
t=1
∑Kt
s=1 pits(Gˆ
t
s)∑h
t=1 C(Gt)
(30)
≤
∑h
t=1
∑Kt
s=1 pits(H
t
s)∑h
t=1 C(H
t
1)
(31)
≤ max
t∈{1,...,h}
∑Kt
s=1 pits(H
t
s)
C(Ht1)
≤ α({pi(·)}i∈N ) (32)
because α(·) is non-decreasing in K.
B. Egalitarian-split Cost-Sharing
Given cost function C(·), we define a truncated cost func-
tion C˜(·) as follows:
C˜(G) ,
{
C(G), if C(G) ≤∑j∈G Cj∑
j∈G Cj , if C(G) >
∑
j∈G Cj
(33)
Note that C˜(G) ≤∑j∈G Cj for any G.
As mentioned earlier, egalitarian-split cost-sharing is equiv-
alent to Nash bargaining solution. Thus,
SPoAC,egaK = SPoA
C,ns
K
Lemma 3. ([4]) For egalitarian and Nash bargaining solu-
tions, we have
SPoAC,egaK (C(·)) = SPoAC,egaK (C˜(·)) (34)
Lemma 4. ([4]) For Nash bargaining solution, given a stable
coalition structure Pˆ ∈PK and G ∈ Pˆ , then every user has
non-negative payment: pnsi (G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ G.
Lemma 5. ([4]) Let bs , C(Hs). Consider the following
maximization problem:
(M1) y∗(K) , max
{Cs,bs}Ks=1
K∑
s=1
(
Cs − (
∑K
t=s Ct)− bs
K − s+ 1
)
(35)
subject to
bs ≤
K∑
t=s
Ct, for all s = 1, ...,K − 1, (36)
0 ≤ Cs ≤ bs ≤ bs+1 ≤ 1, for all s = 1, ...,K, (37)
b1 +KCs −
K∑
t=1
Ct ≥ 0, for all s = 1, ...,K (38)
The maximum of (M1) is upper bounded by y∗(K) ≤ 1 +
HK−1 = O(logK).
Theorem 2. For egalitarian-split cost-sharing mechanism and
Nash bargaining solution with cost monotonicity, the SPoA is
upper bounded by
SPoAC,egaK = SPoA
C,ns
K = O(logK) (39)
Proof. First, by Lemma 3, it suffices to consider egalitarian
bargaining (or Nash bargaining ) solution with cost function
satisfying C(G) ≤∑j∈G Cj for any G.
Next, by Lemma 4, for any stable coalition structure Pˆ , we
have pnsi (G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ G ∈ Pˆ . Hence, by Lemma 2,
SPoAC,egaK ≤ α
({pegai (·)}).
Let Hs = {is, ..., iK}, with the default costs denoted by
{Cs, ..., CK}. Recall that egalitarian bargaining solution is
given by
pegais (Hs) = Cs −
(
∑K
t=s Ct)− C(Hs)
K − s+ 1
subject to C(H1) ≥ ... ≥ C(HK) and C(Hs) ≥
max{Cs, ..., CK} (by monotonicity), and C(Hs) ≤
∑K
t=s Ct
(by Lemma 3). Finally, it follows that SPoAeqaK ≤ O(logK)
by Lemma 5.
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C. Lower Bound on SPoA
Theorem 3. For any cost-sharing mechanism, such that a
stable coalition structure can be found in polynomial-time, its
SPoA is lower bounded by Ω(logK).
Proof. We first define the set cover problem as follows. Given
a collection of sets {S1, ..., Sm} of size at most K and
the corresponding costs {c(S1), .., c(Sm)}, we define a cost
function over any subset G ⊆ ⋃mj=1 Sj as follows:
C(G) =
{
minj|G⊆Sj c(Sj), if there exists Sj ⊇ G
+∞, otherwise
(40)
Note that C(·) obeys cost monotonicity (but C(∅) > 0).
We consider coalition format with the set of participants
defined by N = ⋃mj=1 Sj . Given a social optimum P∗ =
arg minP∈PK C(P), it has to be formed by only coalitions
that are subsets of the Sj’s. Namely, G ∈ P∗, there exists
Sj ⊇ G. For each G ∈ P∗, we take the minimum-cost set
Sj ⊇ G and will obtain a set cover S over N with exactly
the same cost by using {S1, ..., Sm} instead. Namely,
S ,
{
Sj | Sj ⊇ G,C(G) = min
j|G⊆Sj
c(Sj), G ∈ P∗
}
Note that S is a minimum-cost set cover over N . Otherwise,
P∗ is not a social optimum; there is another minimum-cost
set cover that can induce a coalition structure with the lower
social cost than P∗. This shows the reduction of set cover
problem to coalition formation problem.
The set cover problem is known to be inapproximable within
a approximation ratio better than Ω(log(K)) in polynomial-
time, unless P=NP. Hence, in any cost-sharing mecha-
nism, such that a stable coalition structure can be found in
polynomial-time, its SPoA is lower bounded by Ω(logK).
D. Mixed Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Theorem 4. For a mixed cost-sharing mechanism of a con-
stant number of constituent pure cost-sharing mechanisms, if
the SPoA of each constituent pure cost-sharing mechanism is
O(f(K)), then the SPoA of the mixed cost-sharing mechanism
is also O(f(K)).
Proof. Suppose that the mixed cost-sharing mechanism con-
sists of M constituent pure cost-sharing mechanisms. Let Pˆ be
a stable coalition structure induced by the mixed cost-sharing
mechanism. We can partition the set of coalitions of Pˆ into
M subsets {Pˆm}Mm=1, where each G ∈ Pˆm is divided by the
m-th pure cost-sharing mechanism. We write C(Pˆm) as the
social cost considering the participants in Pˆm.
Given a subset of participants x ⊆ N , let OPT(X) be a
social optimum considering only X . We denote the social
cost of OPT(X) by C(OPT(X)). Note that C(OPT(X)) ≤
C(OPT(Y )), if X ⊆ Y , because the cost function C(·) is
monotone and non-negative.
The SPoA of a mixed cost-sharing mechanism can be
expressed as maxC(·),Pˆ
∑M
m=1 C(Pˆm)
C(OPT(N )) . Next, we can bound the
SPoA as follows:
max
C(·),Pˆ
∑M
m=1 C(Pˆm)
C(OPT(N )) (41)
≤ max
C(·),Pˆ
∑M
m=1 C(Pˆm)
1
M
∑M
m=1 C(OPT(Pˆm))
(42)
≤ M ·
M∑
m=1
max
C(·),Pˆ
C(Pˆm)
C(OPT(Pˆm))
(43)
≤ M2 ·O(f(K)) (44)
Therefore, the SPoA of the mixed cost-sharing mechanism
is also O(f(K)), as M is a constant.
E. Convergence to Stable Coalition Structure
Theorem 5. If there is no cyclic preference, then COLN-FORM
will converge to a stable coalition structure in O(nK).
Proof: First, we prove that COLN-FORM will terminate
in finite time, if there is no cyclic preference. We note at
each round, one of the participants must make a proposed
coalition, which has been not proposed before. Otherwise, the
process would have terminated, because every participant is
either suspended (i.e., SUSPENDi = TRUE) or having the
proposed coalition not better than the current one held for
consideration (i.e., ui(Hi) > ui(TOP(PREFi))). Since every
participant i’s preference PREFi is a finite sequence, this
process must terminate.
Next, we show that COLN-FORM terminates with a stable
coalition structure. We prove by contradiction. Suppose P˜ is
a coalition structure outcome by COLN-FORM, and P˜ is not
stable. Namely, there exists a blocking coalition G1 ⊆ N with
respect to P˜ , where |G1| ≤ K, and ui(G1) > ui(G) for all
i ∈ G′ and G ∈ Gi ∩ P˜ . However, G1 must be a proposed
coalition during the process of COLN-FORM and was rejected.
Otherwise, G′ would be an outcome of COLN-FORM, because
all participants in G1 should accept G1, as it is strictly better
than the ones in P˜ . This implies that there exists a participant
i1 ∈ G1, such that there exists G2 ∈ Gi1 , which was proposed
during the process of COLN-FORM and is more preferred than
G1 by i1, (i.e., ui1(G2) > ui1(G1)).
If G2 is not in P˜ , then we can similarly find another
participant i2 ∈ G2, such that there exists G3 ∈ Gi2 , which
was proposed during the process of COLN-FORM and is more
preferred than G2 by i2 (i.e., ui2(G3) > ui2(G2)). We repeat
this argument until we find a coalition Gt ∈ P˜ and is more
preferred than Gt−1 by it−1 (i.e., uit−1(Gt) > uit−1(Gt−1).
Also, we should be able to find Gt such that Gt ∩ G1 6= ∅
because some participants in G1 must be in a coalition in P˜ .
Recall that P˜ is not stable, and G1 is a blocking coalition
with respect to P˜ . Namely, there exists it ∈ Gt∩G1 such that
uit(G1) > uit(Gt).
This creates a cyclic preference, which is a contradiction
to the condition of the theorem. Hence, COLN-FORM should
terminate with a stable coalition structure. The total running
time is O(nK), because each |Gi| = O(nK−1) and there
are totally O(nK) number of coalitions in all preferences of
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participants. Each coalition must be proposed once only. The
total running time is O(nK).
